Day 4: Debunking the Myth of the "Clean Wehrmacht."

WARNING! THIS POST CONTAINS GRAPHIC IMAGES AND DESCRIPTIONS OF CRIMES COMMITTED BY GERMAN FORCES DURING THE SECOND WORLD WAR, INCLUDING RAPE, MASS MURDER, AND TORTURE. THIS IS OBVIOUSLY NOT SAFE FOR WORK. IF THIS DOES NOT SOUND LIKE IT IS FOR YOU, IT MAY BE BEST TO SKIP THIS ONE. YOU HAVE BEEN WARNED.

If you are at all familiar with the vast community of World War II enthusiasts and amateur historians, both on the internet and in real life, you have no doubt at some point encountered individuals who commonly spout what commonly known as the "Clean Wehrmacht" myth: the legend that the Wehrmacht was a simply professional fighting force that fought for the honor and glory of Germany and stayed within the laws of war set out by the Geneva convention, and that horrific, disgusting atrocities committed against Jews, Communists, Slavs, Gypsies, Homosexuals, etc., were solely the actions of the Schutzstaffel (S.S), and, to a lesser extent, the Sturmabteilung (S.A). Its a myth commonly spouted not only by Nazi sympathizers and Right-Wing Militarists, but also regular people who only have a casual interest in history. Often times it will be accompanied by statements like "The Allies committed just as many war crimes" or "The victors write the history books." At one time, I was no different: I was (and, to a lesser extent, still am) very much interested in the World War II-era German Military, and oftentimes found myself defending the Wehrmacht from what I believed, at the time, to be "Baseless" accusations. I look back on my opinions during those days with disgust. I hate this myth: it's baseless, it's objectively incorrect, and, worst of all, it is a whitewashing of the horrific actions committed by one of the worst regimes in history. So, today, on Swords and Socialism, I'm going to spend some time going over the Origin and MANY problems with the myth of the "Clean" Wehrmacht.
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Part 1: Origins

          Generalfeldmarschall Erich von Manstein, famous Wehrmacht commander and early proponent of the "Clean Wehrmacht" myth

So, before we debunk the Myth, let us first delve a little bit into the origins of the Clean Wehrmacht legend. In spite of it's increased attention and growing popularity since the beginning of the internet age, thy myth actually dates back all the way back to the end of the war. Imagine yourself as a Wehrmacht General in early 1945. Germany is losing the war: her armies are in retreat all across Europe, the Armies of Britain, France, the United States, and the Soviet Union are at your borders, and now, the Allied Powers have discovered the Concentration Camps, and news of the atrocities carried out by German troops are being spread across the globe. If you had a head on your shoulders (which, if you're a general, you really should), you would do everything you could to distance yourself from Hitler and the Nazi Regime that, only 4 years ago, you unquestioningly served. This is exactly what happened: While the SS and people like Heinrich Himmler were forced into full blown coverups and engaged in vain attempts to liquidate all the camps to prevent them being found, the Wehrmacht took the “we didn't know” approach and feigned ignorance of the camps and the various orders from Hitler to kill Jews, Communists, and other such "Undesirables." Soon after the end of the war, many Wehrmacht officers, like Erich von Manstein (pictured above), Heinz Guderian, and Franz Halder rushed to publish their own memoirs of their service during World War II and the Third Reich. The overwhelming majority of these memoirs placed heavy emphasis on the distinction between the “Criminal” SS and the “Clean, Efficient” Wehrmacht, and the subject of the holocaust and the Wehrmacht's culpability in the various war crimes committed by the Germans were often glossed over or outright ignored (Franz Halder's memoirs went so far as to push the idea that the war was “Hitler's War”, as in the Wehrmacht was opposed to the idea of war and was pushed into it by Hitler). This narrative of history, that of the honorable, apolitical German Wehrmacht soldier simply fighting for his country who didn't know of the atrocities being committed behind the front lines was very popular in postwar Germany because it shifted much of the blame for the Holocaust off of their shoulders of the average German and onto an abstract "SS" monolith. It also had overt racial undertones: by the end of the war, the overwhelming majority of formations of the Waffen SS (some estimate upwards of 80%) were made up of non-German recruits and conscripts from occupied territories: Ukrainians, Balts, Scandinavians, Slavs, Bosnians, etc., while the Wehrmacht, for the most part, remained a generally all-German force. Shifting all the blame on the SS allowed the German populace to subvertly place the majority of the blame on non-Germans, absolving them (in their minds) of guilt or concupiscence in the atrocities committed in their name.

Albert Schenz, a former Wehrmacht Colonel 
who went on to become Inspector 
of the West German Army, in his West German 
Lieutenant-General's Uniform, 1967

So, as you can see, the myth of the Clean Wehrmacht was born in  the ruble of the defeated Nazi Germany in the early post-war years (1946-55). And it should have died there, as well, had it not been for the Cold War. You see, as the Cold War started to get seriously underway, the Western and Eastern Block countries both realized that, in the (at the time) probable event that war would break out, Germany would be the First battleground: Germany had been divided into East and West Germany at the end of the war (East Germany falling under the Soviet Block, West Germany under the American Block), and Germany was where the Western and Eastern world met. So both countries began pouring money into the two German states to develop armies: West Germany was first in 1955 with the foundation of the Bundeswehr, with East Germany following suit with the formation of the Nationale Volksarmee in 1956. Both of these forces needed militarily-trained individuals to form their respective officer corps, and, as you guessed, they turned to former Wehrmacht soldiers. Both sides recruited vast amounts of Wehrmacht veterans (Up to 27% of the Officers in both the Bundeswehr and Nationale Volksarmee were ex-Wehrmacht). Notable examples include Reinhard Gehlen, Adolf Heusinger, Johanness Stienhoff, and our old friend Erich von Manstein for West Germany, and Vincez Muller, Rudolf Bamler, Wilhelm Adam, and Arno von Lenski for East Germany. Because of this, both blocks usually did not bring Wehrmacht atrocities to light, and were content enough to lay all blame on the SS. In addition to this, because Soviet Archives were closed to the western world until the fall of the USSR, the only accounts of the Eastern front (where an overwhelming majority of German Atrocities were committed) were from generals like Manstein and Guderian, who lied through their teeth and denied that they even knew about the atrocities being committed WHEN THEY OBVIOUSLY DID AND CONDONED THEM. And so, this narrative, of the Brave Wehrmacht Volunteer, who was simply fighting for "The Fatherland," who was free from Anti-Semitism, free from Political Influence, and never did anything that could be even considered immoral persisted. And it's complete, utter horseshit. Here's Why:
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Part 2: Debunking the Myth.

Wehrmacht Officers executing a Soviet POW, 1941

So, where do I begin?

Well, the best place to start (as if there's a "Best" place to start when discussing war crimes) would probably be where the war started itself: Poland. The Wehrmacht's behavior in Poland not only set the tone for how the Wehrmacht would act in the Soviet Union, but it also foreshadowed just how brutal the entire war would be. At Mogilno, in Central Poland, German forces, incited by members of the Mogilno German minority killed 40 Poles. In the village of Wawer, near Warsaw a drunk Polish farmer got into a fight with a German soldier, the Pole produced a knife and managed to wound the German soldier. The reprisal was savage. The local German unit carried out mass killings in the village, and ended up slaughtering 122 people. But that wasn't enough, they proceeded to stop a commercial train heading for Warsaw, the Germans pulled random people off of the train and executed them as well. Their corpses were left hanging in the train station as a warning. There is an account of a German soldier who's unit was attacked by a Polish sniper. They burned the village to the ground and his account of the event is chilling, and shows the inhumanity that the Wehrmacht cultivated:

"Burning houses, weeping women, screaming children, A picture of misery. But the Polish people didn't want it any better. In one of the primitive peasant houses we even surprised a woman servicing a machine gun. The house was turned over and set alight. After a short while the woman was surrounded by flames and tried to get out. But we stopped her, as hard as it was. Soldiers can;t be treated differently just because they're in skirts. Her screaming rang in my ears long after. By the time the military administration of Poland ended in late October, the Germans had killed over 16,000 Poles and burned over 500 villages."

There is another case where a German colonel, angered by the loss of some his men in a gun battle near Ciepielow, had nearly 300 Polish POWs lined up against a wall and shot. This incident was not uncommon: the Wehrmacht often committed atrocities upon the Polish troops they captured. The prisoners of the POW camp in Żyrardów, captured after the Battle of the Bzura, were denied any food and starved for ten days. In many cases Polish POWs were burned alive. Units of the Polish 7th Infantry Division were massacred after being captured in several individual acts of revenge for their resistance in combat. On September 11, Wehrmacht soldiers threw hand grenades into a school building where they kept Polish POWs. The German army also collaborated with local militias to round up Poles and Jews and execute them. The conduct of the Wehrmacht in Poland during the 1939 campaign was so atrocious, that even Reinhard Heydrich, the "Blond Beast" who organized the FINAL SOLUTION said:

"...compared to the crimes, robberies and excesses committed by the army [part of the Wehrmacht], the SS and the police don't look all that bad".

The examples given are just a small smattering, a taste of the horror the Wehrmacht wrought on innocent Polish People: In total, the Wehrmacht murdered some 35,000 Poles and Jews during the Polish Campaign. But this was only the start of the crimes that the Wehrmacht would carry out.

A pair of photos taken by the Polish Underground showing the Wehrmacht rounding up Polish Civilians in Palmiry, Near Warsaw, 1940. These Civilians were murdered shortly after this photo was taken.

The next campaigns in France and Belgium were (Comparatively) murder-free, although there was a notable incident at Vinkt, in Belgium, where the Wehrmacht used Belgian civilians were used as Human Shields, and. in response to continued resistance by Belgian troops in the area, murdered 86 civilians (upward of 600 Belgian Civilians were murdered by Wehrmacht forces in Belgium). In general, the Wehrmacht's conduct in the West was not as terrible as its conduct in the east: while individual examples of rape, murder, and looting occurred, the systematic, regular mass killings that characterized the eastern front were generally less common (though they still happened), and were usually carried out by either the SS or Collaborators rather than the Wehrmacht. HOWEVER, the Wehrmacht's hands in the west WERE NOT CLEAN. Far from it. Some notable examples of Wehrmacht crimes in the western front include:

• the massacre of 1500 black French POWs of West African origin after the fall of France in 1940.
• The razing of many Greek Towns and murder of their inhabitants in response to Partisan Operations. Examples are: Kondomari, Distomo, Mousiotitsa, Kommeno, Drakeia and Kalavryta, Kandanos, Viannos and Kedros.  
• The sack of the Dutch town of Putten, and the deportation of its population (602 people) to concentration camps
• The murder of nearly 30,000 hostages over the course of the war, in reaction to western Partisan Activity
• Famously, The execution of 15 uniformed American Officers at La Spezia in Italy, on the order of General Anton Dossler, in 1944.
• The mass execution of Italian soldiers and POW's after the Italian armistice in 1943. Of particular note is the Cephalonia massacre, on the Island of Cephalonia, Greece, where 5,155 POW's of the Italian 33rd Acqui division by forces of the Wehrmacht 1st Mountain Division (this unit would become famous after the war for the numerous war crimes it committed)

That sounds like a lot, and it is. It is much more than can be excused. These atrocities are enough, in my eyes, to completely condemn the German Wehrmacht and dispel the careful lie their General's weaved in post-war Germany. But it is only the beginning. Oh boy, is it only the beginning.

Memorial to Belgian Civilians murdered by Wehrmacht troops at Vinkt in 1940

Ok. At this point I want to say something: I know I said it at the start of this post, but I will say it again: if the previous paragraphs have made it clear that this post is not for you, for any reason, you should probably stop reading now, as it will only get worse from here. 

Alright. The Eastern Front. Oh God, the Eastern front. I'm going to say this right off the bat: the conduct of the Wehrmacht in the East, when it comes to the treatment of the civilian population, was nothing short of horrifically brutal.

So, in order to dispel the idea that German atrocities in the East were scattered instances and not pre-planned, let's start with on of the more famous examples of German political and racial thought being put in action: the Commissar Order. Issued on June 6, 1941, just days before the Axis powers invaded the Soviet Union, the order was as follows:

Guidelines for the Treatment of Political Commissars:

In the battle against Bolshevism, the adherence of the enemy to the principles of humanity or international law is not to be counted upon. In particular it can be expected that those of us who are taken prisoner will be treated with hatred, cruelty and inhumanity by political commissars of every kind.

The troops must be aware that: 

1. In this battle mercy or considerations of international law is false. They are a danger to our own safety and to the rapid pacification of the conquered territories. 

2. The originators of barbaric, Asiatic methods of warfare are the political commissars. So immediate and unhesitatingly severe measures must be undertaken against them. They are therefore, when captured in battle, as a matter of routine to be dispatched by firearms. 

The following provisions also apply: 

3. ...Political commissars as agents of the enemy troops are recognizable from their special badge—a red star with a golden woven hammer and sickle on the sleeves.... They are to be separated from the prisoners of war immediately, i.e. already on the battlefield. This is necessary, in order to remove from them any possibility of influencing the captured soldiers. These commissars are not to be recognized as soldiers; the protection due to prisoners of war under international law does not apply to them. When they have been separated, they are to be finished off. 

4. Political commissars who have not made themselves guilty of any enemy action nor are suspected of such should be left unmolested for the time being. It will only be possible after further penetration of the country to decide whether remaining functionaries may be left in place or are to be handed over to the Sonderkommandos. The aim should be for the latter to carry out the assessment.

In judging the question "guilty or not guilty", the personal impression of the attitude and bearing of the commissar should as a matter of principle count for more than the facts of the case which it may not be possible to prove.

In basic terms, this meant that all Soviet POWs considered to be commissars or active politically within the Soviet Union, together with all Jewish POWs were to handed over to the Einsatzgruppen to be shot. The result of this was that, between July and October 1941, 580,000–600,000 POWs in Wehrmacht custody were turned over to the SS to be killed. Officers and Generals in the Wehrmacht fully knew that this order was breaking international law under the Geneva Convention: In September 1941, both General Helmuth James von Moltke and Admiral Wilhelm Canaris wrote memos pointing out to Supreme Command that the order of July 17, 1941 was illegal under international law. These concerns were disregarded, with Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel writing in response:

"These scruples accord with the soldierly concepts of a chivalrous war! Here we are concerned with the extermination of an ideology. That is why I approve and defend this measure!"

It should come as no surprise, by the way, that Keitel was executed at Nuremberg after the war for war crimes.
In addition to the more famous "Commissar Order," the Wehrmacht also issued the less famous but decidedly more insidious "Barbarossa Decree" in May of 1941. The full text can be found HERE, but in a nutshell, the main points of the decree are:

• "The partisans are to be ruthlessly eliminated in battle or during attempts to escape", and all attacks by the civilian population against Wehrmacht soldiers are to be "suppressed by the army on the spot by using extreme measures, till [the] annihilation of the attackers;
• Every officer in the German occupation in the East of the future will be entitled to perform execution(s) without trial, without any formalities, on any person suspected of having a hostile attitude towards the Germans", (the same applied to prisoners of war);
• "If you have not managed to identify and punish the perpetrators of anti-German acts, you are allowed to apply the principle of collective responsibility. 'Collective measures' against residents of the area where the attack occurred can then be applied after approval by the battalion commander or higher level of command";
• German soldiers who commit crimes against humanity, the USSR and prisoners of war are to be exempted from criminal responsibility, even if they commit acts punishable according to German law.

This order, among many other things, is what enabled the Wehrmacht to carry out the massive volume of violent crimes on the Slavic Populace that it did during the war. There really isn't much else to say about this order. It's disgusting nature stands on its own, without any need for explanation. It is a clear, obvious proof of the way Nazi Racial permeated throughout the Wehrmacht. And we haven't even gotten to the crimes committed yet. Jesus, this is gonna be a long one.

Mass Hanging of Soviet Civilians in the Soviet Union,
Carried out by Wehrmacht Forces, 1943.

In May of 1941, a month before the start of Operation Barbarossa, General Erich Hoepner, commander of the 4th Panzer Group, issued this directive to his men about the upcoming war in Russia:

"The war against Russia is an important chapter in the German nation's struggle for existence. It is the old battle of the Germanic against the Slavic people, of the defence of European culture against Muscovite-Asiatic inundation and of the repulse of Jewish Bolshevism. The objective of this battle must be the demolition of present-day Russia and must therefore be conducted with unprecedented severity. Every military action must be guided in planning and execution by an iron resolution to exterminate the enemy remorselessly and totally. In particular, no adherents of the contemporary Russian Bolshevik system are to be spared."

This attitude would set the stage for the way the Wehrmacht behaved itself on the Eastern Front.

When the Wehrmacht entered the Soviet Union in June of 1941, thew swept across the Russian Landscape like a horde of locusts. Germany was determined to take advantage of the material wealth of the Soviet Union, as such units were ordered to live off the land. This meant that the Wehrmacht had full clearance to loot Soviet villages and to take whatever materials they felt were necessary to keep themselves alive. These requisitions came at the expense of the local population. In the span of one month, the 12th Infantry Division took over forty tons of meat, 112 tons of oat, 760 tons of hay, 32 heads of cattle, 65 sheep, 94 pigs, 2 tons of potatoes, 770 pounds of butter, 2000 eggs, and over 2000 litres of milk. I will remind the readers that this was the requisition numbers of only one division, and that there were over 150 divisions involved. This result of this mass looting of Soviet land was that the civilian population of the areas under German control had no food, and due to the German policy of burning villages suspected of harboring partisans, had no shelter. The Germans introduced a ration system for civilians, but the Army only gave rations to those who could work in the fields, meaning that pregnant women, children, the elderly, and the sick were left to starve. On the retreat, the Wehrmacht behaved even worse: in attempts to slow the Soviet advance, the Wehrmacht created what were called “Desert Zones” which were areas where all the villages had been burned, and all the local wells poisoned, meaning that no life could be sustained in these areas. The Civilian population in these areas suffered tremendously: all the local males would be conscripted for building duty or sent back to Germany as slave labor. The women and children would be left for dead, or, sometimes, forced at gunpoint into Wehrmacht-Run Brothels (We'll get to those in a minute).

We briefly mentioned the Wehrmacht's policy of burning villages suspected of harboring partisans earlier. This was a sickeningly common occurrence: the aforementioned Barbarossa decree gave German troops permission to do whatever they deemed "necessary" to suppress "partisan operations," and boy did they. As Partisan activity increased behind German lines, the Wehrmacht stepped up the brutality of their reprisals: entire villages were liquidated on the mere suspicion that they were harbouring soldiers. In one case, in Belorussia, a Wehrmacht commander claimed that he had taken 10,940 “partisans” hostage (in fact they were most likely unarmed civilians) and then went on to have 10,400 of them shot. In one year from 1941 to 1942, security units of the Army had killed 80,000 Partisans and “Suspected Partisans,” many of whom were innocent men, women, children, and the elderly. This treatment of "Partisans" would set the standard for what would come next: the systemic targeting of what the Germans viewed as "Lesser Peoples" that characterized the war on the eastern front.

German Forces burning a village in western Russia, 1941

And now, we come to the most famous of the crimes of Nazi Germany: the systemic murder of "undesirables." In the spring of 1941, Reinhard Heydrich and the First quartermaster of the German Army, General Eduard Wagner successfully completed negotiations for co-operation between the Einsatzgruppen and the German Army to allow the implementation of "special tasks." The Einsaztgruppen were mobile squadrons of Waffen SS military and police forces, responsible for the "cleansing" of "Racial and Political enemies of Germany" behind German lines, particuarly on the eastern front (it is estimated that between 1941 and 1945 the Einsatzgruppen and related auxiliary troops killed more than two million people, including 1.3 million Jews). Following the Heydrich-Wagner agreement on April 28, 1941, Feldmarshal Walther von Brauchitsch ordered when Operation Barbarossa began that all German Army commanders were to identify and register all Jews in the occupied areas in the Soviet Union at once and to co-operate fully with the Einsatzgruppen." But it didn't stop there. Oh no. In addition to playing a central role in rounding up Jews and aiding the Einsatzgruppen, the Wehrmacht themselves were involved heavily in the massacres of Jews in the Eastern Front, most famously at Babi Yar, where they were responsible for rounding up the Jews in Kiev, and guarding the area while the Einsatzgruppen carried out the executions of some 33,000 people. The Wehrmacht also played a vital role in supplying and aiding the various Nazi-Allied militias that sprang up in areas like Lithuania and Ukraine, such as the Ukrainian Insurgent Army under Stephan Bandera, who carried out a war of extermination against the Polish Population of Ukraine, and the Ypatingasis būrys in Lithuania, partially responsible for the wholesale destruction of the Jews of Lithuania, a country which went from having the Highest Jewish population in Europe to losing 95% of that population overnight. The instances of Wehrmacht forces being taught, instructed, and carrying out assaults and attacks on the Jewish populations of Eastern Europe are numerous and well documented. Here are a few choice examples of Wehrmacht orders, directives, or actions that showed the nature of their crimes:

• After Anti-Jewish operations carried out by units of the SS Cavalry Brigade that killed nearly 2,000 Soviet solders and Partisans and over 14,000 Jews in August 1941, General Max von Schenckendorff, who commanded the rear areas of Army Group Centre ordered on August 10, 1941 that all Wehrmacht security divisions when on anti-partisan duty were to emulate the Brigades' Example
• Between September 24 and 26, 1941 in Mogilev, again on the orders of General Von Sckenckendorff, a joint SS-Wehrmacht seminar was organized on how best to murder Jews. The seminar ended with the 7th Company of Police Battalion 322 shooting 32 Jews at a village called Knjashizy before the assembled officers as an example of how to "screen" the population for partisans.
• During November of 1941, 707th Infantry division carried out an "anti-partisan" sweep that saw the division shoot 10,431 people out of the 19,940 it had detained. The 707th would later go down infamously as carrying out the most war crimes of any Wehrmacht unit in the east.
• At Mirgorod, the 62nd Infantry Division executed "the entire Jewish population (168 people) for associating with partisans
• At Novomoskovsk, the 444th Security Division reported that they had killed "305 bandits, 6 women with rifles (Flintenweiber), 39 prisoners-of-war and 136 Jews"
• In revenge for a partisan attack that had killed one German soldier, the Ersatz-Brigade 202 "as an act of retaliation shot 20 Jews from the villages of Bobosjanka and Gornostajewka and burnt down 5 Jew-houses".
• On October 10, 1941 General Walther von Reichenau drafted an order to be read to the troops under his command stating that: "the soldier must achieve full understanding of the necessity for a harsh but just vengeance against Jewish subhumanity."[64] Upon hearing of Reichenau's Severity Order, Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt, the commander of Army Group South announced his "complete agreement" with it, and sent out a circular to all of the Army generals under his command urging them to send out their own versions of the Severity Order, which would impress upon the troops the need to exterminate Jews.
• On November 20th, 1941, Erich von Manstein (yes, him again), issued an order in which he stated: "Jewry is the middleman between the enemy at our rear and the still fighting remnants of the Red Army and the Red leadership; more than in Europe, it [Jewry] occupies all key posts of the political leadership and administration, of trade and crafts and forms the nucleus for all disquiet and possible revolts. The Jewish-Bolshevist system must be exterminated once and for all."
• The Holocaust in Serbia stands out as a particularity huge example of the Wehrmacht's participation in the Holocaust. At Šabac, "Central European Jewish refugees, mostly Austrians, were shot by troops of predominantly Austrian origin in retaliation for casualties inflicted by Serbian partisans on the German Army". The orders issued by Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel in September 1941 called for the German Army to shoot 100 Serbs for every German soldier killed by the Serb guerrillas and did not call for Jews to be singled out. But because of rampant anti-Semitism in the German officer corps, it was more or less automatically assumed that the Serbian Jewish community were behind all of the partisan attacks, hence the targeting of Jews in the mass shootings carried out in retaliation for guerrilla attacks. To day, it is thought that the Wehrmacht in Serbia was responsible for the majority of the killings of Jews, not the SS.

Executed Soviet Prisoners of war, 1942

When it comes to the treatment of Prisoners of war, The Wehrmacht continued it's trend of brutality. Whilst Camps for Western POWs (French, British, US, etc.) were usually up to humanitarian standards, their camps for Soviet POWs were woefully and purposefully inadequate. By December 1941, the German army had taken nearly 2.4 million Soviet Soldiers prisoner. These men suffered from malnutrition and diseases such as typhus that resulted from the Wehrmacht's purposeful denial sufficient food, shelter, proper sanitation and medical care. Prisoners were regularly subject to torture, beatings and humiliation. And then there were the purposeful killings: All Jews, commissars, "intellectuals" and Muslims serving in the Red Army were either executed by the Wehrmacht or handed over to the SS to be shot. The Muslim POWs were shot because they were circumcised, and therefore might be Jewish; it was felt to be safer to simply shoot all circumcised POWs rather run the risk that a Jewish POW might escape execution by claiming to be a Muslim. . A grand total of 5.7 million Soviet soldiers were taken prisoner during the war, of whom at least 3.3 million (58 percent of the total) died in captivity.

German soldiers entering a Soldatenbordell in Brest, France (1940). The building is a former Synagogue.

I'm going to end this Rant (because i can't stomach it anymore) with coverage of the Wehrmacht Brothel System. Army brothels, known as Soldatenbordell in Germany, were set up by the 3rd Reich throughout both Germany and the territories that the conquered. By 1942, there were upwards of 500 German Soldatenbordell set up throughout Europe. Similar to the Japanese "Comfort Women" system (There will be a separate article discussing the crimes of the Japanese army), these brothels were staffed by upwards of 35,000 women from about 15-35, mostly from Poland and the Soviet Union, who had been kidnapped and forced into sexual slavery. The Polish Government in Exile issued a document on May 3, 1941, describing the mass kidnapping raids, known as łapanka or rafle, conducted in Polish cities with the aim of capturing young women for sexual slavery at brothels run by the German military. At the same time, Polish girls as young as 15, classified as suitable for slave labor and shipped to Germany, were sexually exploited by German men at their place of destination. The Swiss Red Cross mission driver Franz Mawick wrote this passage in 1942 about the rampant rape he saw committed by German Soldiers in Warsaw:

 "Uniformed Germans [...] gaze fixedly at women and girls between the ages of 15 and 25. One of the soldiers pulls out a pocket flashlight and shines it on one of the women, straight into her eyes. The two women turn their pale faces to us, expressing weariness and resignation. The first one is about 30 years old. "What is this old whore looking for around here?" – one of the three soldiers laughs. "Bread, sir" – asks the woman. "A kick in the ass you get, not bread" – answers the soldier. The Owner of the flashlight directs the light again on the faces and bodies of girls. [...] The youngest is maybe 15 years old. They open her coat and start groping her with their lustfull paws. "This one is ideal for bed" – he says."

In the Soviet Union women were kidnapped by German forces for prostitution as well; one report by International Military Tribunal writes: "in the city of Smolensk the German Command opened a brothel for officers in one of the hotels into which hundreds of women and girls were driven; they were mercilessly dragged down the street by their arms and hair."

I will stop the description of the crimes of the Wehrmacht here, as I cannot stomach writing about them any more. If you are still interested in learning more about this subject, I suggest Roland Binet's excellent article on the subject found HERE. 

The myth of the Clean Wehrmacht, born out of the lies of the people who carried out these actions, and prolonged by Cold-War militarism, has lasted far longer than it ever should have. 17 million men served in the Wehrmacht: far too numerous among them were those mindless men who supported Hitler to the bitter end, passively or actively, morally, politically, lethargically, or even by working hard, in an effective manner, within that gigantic hate and killing machine. And now, as the population of those who saw and experienced such brutality at the hands of the Wehrmacht is decreasing rapidly, it is our duty to maintain this horrific memory. To make the oft-quoted words "Never again" actually MEAN something. This myth has lived on long enough. Let's destroy it now.

Day 3: The Browning Automatic Rifle and World War 2 Suppressing Fire Tactics.

By the outbreak of World War 2 on September 1st, 1939, the Armies of the world had fully realized the destructive power of Machine Guns. Their Colossal fire power, suppression capabilities, and capability for annihilation were all dully noted by the Army Brass, and the horrific slaughter they caused in the Great war some 25 years earlier was still fresh in the mind's of the Generals of Europe and Asia, many of whom had fought in the war and experienced the power of the Machine Gun first hand. In the years leading up to the Second World War, new advances in Machine Gun Technology began to radically change Machine Gun tactics: Developments such as advanced Air-Cooling systems and interchangeable barrels allowed for the increased lightening of so-called "Heavy: machine guns, the development of Light Machine Guns such as the Bren Gun and DP-28, and the slow removal of heavy, bulky, water-cooled machine guns from front line service. However, despite the rapid advancements in Machine Gun Technology, the United States lagged behind. Today, on Swords and Socialism, we will discuss the Browning Automatic Rifle (BAR), the United States' main Light Machine Gun in both World Wars, World War 2 suppressing fire tactics, and why the US lagged so far behind.

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Part 1: The BAR - A History

Diagram of a M1918A2 BAR

When the United states entered World War 1 in April 1917, they found themselves with a woefully insufficient and antiquated hodgepodge of machine guns: the Army, in total, only had about 1100 machine guns, and these were a mixture of old Colt M1895's, Maxim M1904's, and M1909 Benét–Mercié's. Realizing quickly that this situation was untennable in the context of a looming war involving millions of soldiers, the Army began to make provisions for the development and adoption of a new Standard machine gun for the Military (until that time, US troops would be issued with surplus British and French Equipment.)

Enter John Moses Browning, the legendary and prolific Gunsmith, who, to this day, is America's most famous and most copied firearms designer. Browning was already well known by the United States Military: he was the brainchild behind the Colt M1911, which had been adopted as the Army's official sidearm, and his commercial arms, such as the Winchester 1894 Lever Action Rifle, Winchester 1897 Pump Shotgun, and Colt M1903 Pocket Pistol, were well known as effective and reliable weapons, and sold millions of models throughout the world.

Browning Demonstrating his "Browning Automatic Rifle" at the Winchester Plant, 1917

In February 1917, (before the United State's entrance into World War 1), Browning personally brought two prototype machine guns to Washington DC for demonstration in an attempt to win a government contract. One was a water-cooled heavy machine gun (which would later be adopted as the Browning M1917, and will be covered at a later date), and the other was a prototype of what would soon become the Browning Automatic Rifle (BAR).

The BAR as it was adopted in 1918

At the time, the BAR was a radical and revolutionary design. It was an air-cooled, selective-fire automatic rifle that used a gas-operated, long-stroke gas piston rod, moved by propellant gases bled through a vent in the barrel. Firing from an open bolt (when the rifle is ready to fire, the bolt is held back or "open." When the trigger is pulled, the bolt slams forward, chambering a round and firing it). It's sights went out to 1,500 yards, although hitting anything intentionally at that range was more of a fantasy than anything else. It was chambered in .30-06, the US Army's standard cartridge at the time, and was fed through a 20 round box magazine. It fired either in semi-automatic or fully automatic at a rate of around 600 rounds a minute. Weighing in at around 16 pounds, the weapon seems heavy until you realize that standard heavy machine guns of the time, such as the British Vickers or German MG--08 could weigh upwards of 150 POUNDS. Even so-called "Light" Machine guns of the time, such as the British Lewis gun or French Chauchat weighed in at around 30 pounds, making the BAR look like a feather in comparison. Overall, the BAR was an effective, efficient, and revolutionary design in 1917.

Browning demonstrating the BAR to US Army field testers, 1917

On 23 February, 1917, Browning, in front of an assembled host of nearly 300 people (including military brass, congressmen, senators, ambassadors, foreign dignitaries, and the press), conducted a live-fire demonstration with both of his prototypes. It was a complete and total success: Browning was immediately awarded a contract for the weapon and the BAR was hastily adopted into service. Further testing conducted in May 1917 supported that decision, and the BAR was officially adopted as the Rifle, Caliber .30, Automatic, Browning, M1918, or better known as the M1918 BAR, and an order was placed for 12,000 units, to be fulfilled by the Winchester Company. However, despite the need for machine guns, production of BAR's did not begin to enter production until February 1918. The BAR's first began to enter France with the American Expeditionary Force (AEF) in July 1918, but were kept in reserve until 13 September 1918, when they were put into the hands of American Troops during the Battle of Saint-Mihiel, and were later used extensively during the Meuse-Argonne Offensive in October-November. Overall, for the short time the BAR was in use in American hands, the BAR performed admirably for its time.

An Illustration of the M1918A1 BAR, the first major modification to the BAR done by the US Army

During the Interwar years, the BAR underwent two major "upgrades." The first was the M1918A1, adopted in June of 1937. The M1918A1 added a light bipod to the gas cylinder shroud and a hinged steel butplate. The intent of these changes was to increase the BAR's accuracy when firing short bursts. However, few M1918's were ever converted to the M1918A1 configuration, making it one of the rarest forms of the BAR. It was also around this time that the Colt Company, who now had production rights over the BAR, began to export the rifle, and it was adopted by several countries, in particular, Belgium, Poland, and Sweden. Each of these countries made their own variations to the original BAR design (but we'll cover that Later).

The Browning M1918A2, as used by US Forces in the Second World War

In April of 1938, the US Military deemed the limited improvements of the M1918A1 to be insufficient to modernize the BAR, and began work on a new set of upgrades. This new model was officially adopted as the M1918A2 BAR in June of 1938. The new M1918A2 model added a new rate-reducer mechanism designed by Springfield Armory, and housed in the buttstock. The rate reducer also provided two selectable rates of fully automatic fire only, activated by engaging the selector toggle. The bipod on the Gas Piston shroud was replaced by one attached at the muzzle,   magazine guides were added to the front of the trigger guard, the hand guard was shortened, a heat shield was added to help the cooling process, a small separate stock rest (monopod) was included for attachment to the butt, the buttstock itself was lengthened by one inch, and the weapon's role was changed to that of a squad light machine gun. Because of all these additions, the M1918A2 weighed in at 20 pounds, 4 pound heavier than the M1918. This was the main Light Machine Gun that the US Infantry entered World War 2 with. Unfortunately, the decision to keep tweaking the now vastly-outdated BAR instead of adopting a whole new light machine gun would prove disastrous in the long run.
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Part 2: Suppressing Fire Tactics in World War Two.

A British Machine Gun team training near Bou Arada, Tunisia, 1943

Before we go any further, it is important to cover what suppressing fire is, and the different theories and strategies of fire suppression that existed around the start of World War Two.

Firstly, what exactly is suppressing fire? Well, dear reader, in a battlefield context, suppressing fire is gunfire who's job is to keep the enemy from carrying out it's objectives. This is usually done by covering the battlefield with large volumes of fire, mainly provided by Machine Guns, with sub machine guns, rifles, and other small arms providing a supporting role. The point of suppressing fire is not necessarily to kill the enemy: it is simply fire layed out to keep the enemy's head down and not firing at you so that your own troops could advance.

British Bren Gunner's in action, early 1940's

Now, with that out of the, the way, at the start of World War 2, there were 3 major schools of suppressing fire "theory," so to speak. The first was the light machine gun school, pioneered by the French and developed by the British. Its adherents included most of Europe, including countries such as Britain, France, Japan, Romania, Sweden, USSR, Belgium, Italy and many others. These countries equipped their infantry squad with bolt-action rifles and a magazine-fed light machine gun on bipod with a quickly interchangable barrel (Guns like the Bren, DP-28, FN 24/29, etc.) . The intention was to have a weapon that was capable of the supressing fire heavy machine guns (mounted on tripods) were but quick to set up and light enough to not hinder advancing troops. Nations of this school retained heavy machine guns in specialized units, often at as a machine-gun company attached to a regiment of infantry to provide the World War 1 levels of suppressing planned fire.

      

German Machine Gun Crew manning an MG-34, 1940's

      The second school was that of the general purpose machine gun.  Germany was the only real adherent of this school before World War 2, and their MG-34 and MG-42 are primary examples of this: Instead of using magazine-fed light machine guns, the General Purpose Machine Gun school made the World War 1 machine gun lighter - adding an advanced air cooling systems (and thus removing the heavy water cooling systems of World War 1 Era Machine Guns), rapidly interchangeable barrels, bipod (but the same gun could be mounted on a tripod if needed) and pistol grip. These were belt-fed weapons and heavy compared to the light machine guns used by other nations (Bren Mk III - 8,68kg empty, MG 34 - 12,1kg empty), but they provided a much higher rate of fire than their lighter counterparts, who could not fire as fast and had far smaller magazine capacities.

US GI's in action, 1940's

      The third and final school of suppressing fire was the rifle firepower school. While, before World War 1, the British and French had been adherents to this school, the only adherent before World War 2 were the Americans. The Americans believed that if each soldier was equipped with a semi-automatic rifle, they would be able to provide their own covering fire. Heavy Machine guns would still be retained, much like in the Light Machine Gun School, but mostly for defensive purposes instead. Because of this, in the minds of the US Army Brass, there was no real need to adopt a new Light Machine gun, and therefore, the BAR was sufficient to provide support while much of the suppressing fire came from the increased firepower from each individual rifleman. It is telling to note that the United States was the only adherent to this school before World War 2, and this system was dropped not long after the end of the war.

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Part 3: Problems with the BAR and American Suppressing Fire Doctrine in General.

US Marine Gunner Using His BAR on Okinawa, 1945

So what was the big issue with the BAR? Well, to put it simply, while it was a innovative and advanced design when it was introduced in 1917, by 1945, it was an outdated design that had been updated to address either non-issues or the wrong issues, and forced to fulfill a role it was not designed to fill: that of the Light Support Machine Gun.  It is important to note that other countries who adopted the BAR as their Squad Support Machine Gun (In particular Poland, Sweden, and Belgium), they added several necessary updates such as advanced air cooling systems, and better bipods, which allowed the BAR to satisfactorily fill the role of Squad Light Machine Gun. The American Military, on the other hand, Ignored this changes entirely, and making updates that werer generally unnecessary to fix problems that did not exist. Because of this, the American BAR lacked several key components that would allow it to function in a light machine gun capacity: the major one being that it lacked any sort of advanced air cooling system or easily replaceable barrel, meaning that delivering prolonged, sustained supressive fire with it was impossible. As it turned out, when US troops first entered action, they realized that their individual semiautomatic M1 Garands, while giving American Soldiers an important increase of firepower on an individual level, on a squad level, their rate of fire was far slower than that of a comparable German, Japanese, or even Italian squad. This meant that the BAR was pressed into service to serve as a weapon comparable to a light machine gun, something it was never designed to do. To make matters worse, the Americans shunned the sub-machine gun - while other nations equipped their NCOs and eventually both squad leader and squad leader assistant with an sub-machine gun, the American army equipped them either with an M1 Garand or the ligher M1 Carbine (which also fired semi-automatically). Sub-machine guns were used for rear area troops in the American army, except for among the paratroopers (which also used M1919A6 bipod-mounted belt-fed general purpose machine guns). The Soviets went so far that they equipped a sub-machine gun company in every infantry regiment with only light machine guns and sub-machine guns, and the Germans did similarly, as well as developing the first ever assault rifle (the Stg-44), thus increasing the average firepower of a German Squad even more. This, in the end, left the average American Unit with far less firepower than their opponents, in spite of their advanced Semi-automatic Rifles.

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Part 4: Epilogue

Polish Partisan Wielding a Polish Improved BAR, 1944

In the end, as much as I have ragged on the BAR, it is important to note that the BAR was not a bad gun; it simply was a weapon that was kept in service for far longer than it should have had. It was certainly a hell of a gun in 1917, but, in the configuration it was in when the US entered war in 1941, it had aged long past it's prime. During the war, the doctrine that gave the US troops the M1 Garand rifle also gave them no sub-machine guns and very few machine guns (and all of them heavy tripod-mounted) and an inadequate light machine gun. While the M1 Garand was an excellent rifle, experience was that it could not compensate for the lack of firepower of the American infantry. In the end, despite the advanced rifle technology of the United States Military in World War 2, It was the absolutely superb American artillery, and how superbly it was integrated with the infantry, that made the American infantry division the fearsome and effective formation it was. But that is a post for another time.

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Day 2: The Most Important Battle of World War Two (that you've probably never heard of): The Battle of Khalkhin Gol

World War II was truly a massive affair. While students in the American Classroom are usually only ever exposed to the American Campaign in Western Europe and the Pacific Island Hopping Campaign, World War II was so much larger: From the picturesque fjords of Norway to the steaming Burman Jungle, from hot deserts of Italian Somalia to the barren tundra of the American Aleutian Islands, from the Frozen waters of North sea to the Muddy Planes of Kursk, and everywhere in between, all of these places saw intense fighting. The prolific amount of fans and amateur historians that World War II has gained on the internet are quick to pinpoint the key battles: El Alamein in Egypt, where the tide was turned against the Axis Forces in North Africa, Stalingrad in the Soviet Union, where the German Push into the east was finally beaten back, Midway in the Pacific, which broke the back of Japanese Naval Power, and a dozen more besides: Normandy, The Bulge, Kursk, Guadalcanal, Monte Cassino, et al. Yet, there is one battle of this great war that gets constantly overlooked, one which is constantly forgotten in the lists of the biggest and most important. With this post, I hope to rectify that. Today, we'll be discussing the battle that kept Japan out of the Soviet Union for good. This is the story of the Battle of Khalkhin Gol: The most important battle of World War II that you've never heard of.
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Part 1: Prelude to War.

Japanese Troops enter Shenyang during the Mudken Incident, 1932

The Khalkhin Gol is a 145 mile-long river that runs near the village of Nomonhan, on the Sino-Mongolian Border. It was here, in 1939, that Russo-Mongolian and Japanese forces met to decide the fate of Northern China, Mongolia, and The Soviet Union itself.

The root of the conflict can be found in the history of Sino-Japanese Relations in the region. In the aftermath of the Mukden Incident in 1931 (a Japanese False flag attack, with the intent of giving Japan an excuse to declare war on China), Japan had invaded Manchuria (shown here) in 1932, setting up the puppet state of Manchukuo, under the nominal rule of the deposed former emperor of China, Puyi (Japan would later go on to invade all of China in 1937, sparking the Second Sino-Japanese War.)  After their conquest of Manchuria, the Japanese began to turn their attentions north, towards the Newly Proclaimed Mongolian People's Republic, and its powerful ally, the Soviet Union. Tensions in this region between the Japanese and the Russians (and later, the Soviet Union) had always been high, as both nations competed with each other for both political and economic influence over Northern China. Sometimes, these tensions flared up into open warfare (such as the famous Russo-Japanese war, which established temporary Japanese dominance in Manchuria), but things had been, at the very least, peaceful between the Soviets and the Japanese. With the Japanese invasion of Manchuria, however, tensions increased tenfold. Japan feared that the USSR would sweep into majority-Mongolian sections of China that they occupied, as well as intervene on the side of the Communists and their (temporary) Nationalist allies to drive the Japanese out of China. Likewise, the Soviets were afraid that the Japanese would invade the Soviet Union through Mongolia. These fears were well founded. Several members of the Japanese High Command were already planning for an eventual invasion of the soviet union. This faction of Officers, known as the "Strike North" faction, planned for an invasion of the soviet union, aiming for the Trans-Siberian railroad: the lifeline of soviet forces in the east. Once the Trans-Siberian had been severed, the Strike North officers argued, the Japanese empire could then be expanded to include all of Mongolia, the Soviet maritime provinces and parts of Siberia. Shielded by those buffer territories, the natural resources and heavy industries of Manchukuo could then be fully developed by the Japanese. Bereft of outside support, Chinese resistance would collapse.

In this already tense environment, relations were worsened due to a border dispute between Mongolia and Manchukuo. Japanes-backed Manchukuo claimed that the border ran along the Khalkhin-Gol river, whereas Soviet-backed Mongolia argued that the border actually ran just east of Nomonhan village, some 10 miles east of the river. At Halhamiao, in 1935, things came to a head when a force of Mongolian Cavalry assaulted a combined Japanese-Manchurian Patrol on the banks on the Khalkhin River. Although the so-called "Halhamiao incident" was a small affair, and there were few casualties, it sparked increased skirmishing across the border. Between 1935-1939, the amount of border clashes between Soviet-aligned and Japanese-aligned forces grew by almost 400%, as well as beginning to involve more and more troops and material (tanks, planes, artillery, etc.) The amount of troops in the region increased as well. By the start of 1939, The Soviets had Nearly 80,000 men in the region, while the Japanese had nearly 100,000 Both sides were supported by an unknown, but large amount of Chinese and Mongolian Auxiliaries. However, while the frequency and size of the skirmishes was increasing (The Battle of Lake Khasan in 1938 involved nearly 30,000 men, as well as tanks and artillery), a large-scale decisive battle had yet to occur. Knowing that the current state of affairs could not last, both sides massed their forces for the eventual, decisive battle that was sure to come.
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Part 2: The Battle.

Mongolian Soldiers defend against a Japanese attack on the Khalkhin river, 1939.

The Battle that would decide the fate of the Far East began on May 11th, 1939. when a 90 man Mongolian Cavalry detachment crossed the Khalkhin in search of pasture for their horses to graze on. A Manchurian Cavalry detachment was alerted to their presence and attacked, driving the Mongols back across the river. Within two days (May 13th), the Mongolians returned, this time with greater numbers, and drove the Manchurians back to their original positions. The next day (May 14th), two regiments of the Japanese 23rd Infantry Division, under the command of Lt. Col. Yaozo Azuma, arrived to restore the old border. The Mongolians, fearing encirclement, retreaded back across the river. On May 28th, however, they returned, and Azuma's forces moved to intercept them. It was a disaster: Azuma's forces were completely encircled and, in a few hours, were driven back, suffering 105 dead and 33 wounded, a 64% casualty rate. After this debacle, both sides settled into an uneasy period of inactivity, as they treated their wounded and build up their forces. The Soviets brought Corps Commander General Georgy Zhukov (yes, THAT Georgy Zhukov) in to take command of their forces, while the Japanese placed their forces under the command of veteran General Michitarō Komatsubara: A Veteran of  both the Russo-Japanese war and World War I, who was well-acquainted with the Russians (he had previously served as a military attaché to the Russian empire, and was fluent in Russian.) By the time fighting resumed, both sides had amassed thousands of men, backed up by Tanks, aircraft, and artillery.

The Mongolian steppe exploded once again when, on June 27, after a month of quiet, the Japanese launched a surprise air raid on the Soviet Airbase at Tamsak-Bulak, several miles behind the front lines. The Soviets were caught completely off guard: Many of their aircraft were destroyed on the ground, and destroyed twice as many Soviet planes as they had lost themselves. The Soviets responed to this attack swiftly, and in force: 6 squadrons of Polikarpov I-152 biplanes and three squadrons of Polikarpov I-16 Type 10 monoplanes, totaling more than 100 fighters, were deployed to the Khalkhin front, commanded and staffed by veteran fliers of the Soviet Air force, many of whom had seen service flying for the Second Spanish Republic during the Spanish Civil War. The Japanese response, however, was the exact opposite: when High Command back in Tokyo got news of the attack, they were enraged, as they had not been informed of the plans for attack beforehand. Furious, the High Command ordered that there would be no further airstrikes against soviet airbases - A rash mistake that the Japanese Infantry would soon pay for in blood.

Japanese Troops Crossing the Khalkhyn, 1939

However, despite pulling air support out of the theater, the Japanese High Command authorized Komatsubara to launch a land attack to expel the "Invaders." Komatsubara planed out a two-pronged assault on the Soviet Lines: On the Left Flank, Japanese Forces, spearheaded by mechanized brigades, would drive the Soviets back to the Halha river several miles back. Meanwhile, on the right flank, Japanese forces would cross the river to the north and then sweep south, cutting off the subsequent Soviet retreat. This would result, Komarsubara hoped, in a total encirclement and destruction of Soviet forces.

On July 1st, the Japanese began to put their plan into action. 8 brigades of the Japanese right flank crossed the Khalkhyn river via pontoon bridge and advanced on the Soviet-held Baintsagan heights. After a brief firefight they managed to dislodge the small group of Soviet defenders and take them. In response to this, Zhukov threw the Soviet 11th Tank and 7th Armored Brigades, a total of 450 tanks,  at the heights in a hastily-organized counter attack. Despite the lack of proper infantry support that usually would have doomed an assault like this, the Japanese were unable to effectively counter the Soviet armor, largely because the Japanese Lacked proper anti-tank guns, mines, and other equipment, forcing the Japanese to resort to Molotov Cocktails and other crude anti-tank devices hurled at the Soviet armor. After 2 days of fierce fighting, involving suicidal assaults by the Japanese on Soviet armor groups, the Japanese defenders were dislodged from their positions, and forced to retreat back across the pontoon bridge. For the next 6 days, the Japanese hurled themselves at the Soviet forces on the other side of the river. Al these assaults ended in failure: the Japanese failed to properly use their armored units in conjuncture with their infantry, and the Soviet Armor and defensive positions were simply too strong. The Japanese lost 45 tanks, nearly 1/3rd of their armor, while Soviet tank losses were negligible, and easily replaced. By June 10th, the assaults were called off, and the pontoon bridge was withdrawn.

During this period, Zhukov was constantly building up his forces: with a fleet of over 3,500 trucks, Zhukov was able to consistently bring in fresh troops, fuel, and supplies over dirt roads from the major Soviet rail depot along the Trans-Siberian Railway, some 460 miles away. The Japanese, on the other hand, were plagued with supply problems. While the Japanese supply base of Hailaerh was only 200 miles away (nearly 260 miles closer than the Soviet's), the lack of decent roads and motorized transportation made resupplying the Japanese forces a nightmare. All of these problems were exacerbated by the inhospitable nature of the Khalkhin battlefield. Broiling hot days, and freezing, damp nights wore away at the strength and morale of the Japanese infantry. Bad sanitation and lack of water bred dysentery and typhus, and shortages of supplies in the Japanese lines only made these problems worse: Japanese troops sometimes went for days without water in the scorching 104 degree heat. While the Soviets also suffered some of these problems, they were, for the most part, combated effectively due to their better management of supplies.

Soviet Soldiers Inspect Captured Japanese Artillery, 1939

Undaunted by these setbacks, Komatsubara withdrew his soldiers into defensive positions along the Khalkhin River, and began planning his next move. The new Japanese plan consisted of a massive preliminary artillery barrage to knock out the Soviet heavy artillery, followed by a night assault on Soviet positions (which, at this point, had been established on both sides of the Khalkhin river). TO accomplish this, Komatsubara brought up six 150mm Type 89 Guns and sixteen 105mm Type 92 Guns. On July 23rd, the bombardment of Soviet positions along the Khalkhin began. But the Japanese found themselves outgunned by the Soviet batteries. The twelve Soviet 152mm M1937 Howitzers and sixteen 122mm M1931 Corps Guns simply outnumbered, outranged, and outshot their Japanese counterparts. This put the 2 Japanese divisions assaulting the Soviet positions at a distinct disadvantage, as the Soviets were able to cover their positions with artillery fire. At the Kawatama bridge, 2 days of fierce fighting resulted in a stalemate, with no major gains on either side. By July 25th, after 2 days of savage fighting, with constant attack and counter-attack, capturing and re-capturing on both sides, the Japanese forces, exhausted, were forced to pull back to their original lines and construct defensive positions. At this point, the fighting ha spread out along a 30km (about 18mi) front. The Japanese had suffered nearly 5,000 casualties. The soviets had suffered a similar amount. But, unlike the Japanese, the Soviet casualties could be replaced.

Soviet Troops Advance Behind a BT-5 Tank, 1939.

By the end of July, the Japanese forces along the Khalkhin front were exhausted. The failed assaults had drained the energy of the Japanese infantry, and their supplies were becoming stretched thin. Komatsubara, realizing that discretion was the better part of valor, reluctantly began directing his energies towards constructing defensive positions, building a system of field fortifications and bunkers along the front. On August 10th, Komatsubara's forces were organized into the 6th Army. His forces now numbered 75,000 men, 318 guns, 135 tanks and 250 warplanes. Soviet forces under Zhukov now consisted of the entire First Army Group, numbering 57,000 men, 542 guns, 498 tanks and 515 aircraft. Both sides expected this lull in the fighting to be temporary, and both were planning new assaults to resume the offensive. But, by this point, the advantage had swung decisively over to the Soviets. Back in Moscow, Stalin, anxious to shore up his eastern flan in preparation for the Russo-German invasion of Poland, sent Zhukov additional 1,625 trucks from European Russia. This gave Zhukov the logistical base he needed for a decisive assault.  

All through early and mid August Zhukov quietly moved up reinforcements. The troops moved only at night, masking the sound of tanks massing with late night bombing raids and small arms fire on Japanese positions. Zhukov deliberately ordered his men to continue constructing defensive positions to convince the Japanese that they were digging in for the winter, while sending out patrols to scout and probe enemy positions by night. Zhukov, absorbing the tactical lessons of the Spanish Civil War, insisted on careful cooperation between the air and ground forces. Air reconnaissance was used to pinpoint Japanese defense positions, and pilots were made to participate in ground briefings with the Red Army. By mid August, Zhukov's forces had swelled to over 100,000 men. Using information gleaned from the Japanese attacks in July,  Zhukov realized there were several major flaws in his enemy's defensive formation. The Japanese flanks were covered by unreliable Manchukuoan cavalry and were vulnerable to encirclement. The Japanese also did not possess a tactical mobile reserve. To cope with flank attacks, they would be compelled to focus on one flank at a time, and disengage forces from action in the center or the other flank. Armed with this knowledge, Zhukov now began to plan his assault. His plan was to split the Japanese lines in  two, and then proceed to surround and envelop the pockets of Japanese resistance. To do this, Zhukov divided the Soviet battle line into three sections: the Southern force (consisting of the 6th Mongolian Cavalry Division, the 7th Armored Brigade, the 601st Infantry Regiment of the 82nd Rifle Division and two battalions of the 11th Tank Brigade), the Central force (consisting of the 36th Motorized Rifle Division, the 5th Machine Gun Brigade and the 82nd Rifle Division), and the Northern Force (consisting of the 57th Rifle Division, two battalions of the 11th Tank Brigade, three battalions of the 6th Brigade and the 8th Mongolian Cavalry Division). The 9th Armored Brigade, one battalion of the 6th Tank Brigade and the 212th Airborne Brigade were kept as a strategic mobile reserve. While the Central force would pin the Japanese in place, the Northern and Southern forces would wheel around the Japanese flank and force them to collapse in on each other, resulting in the splitting of the Japanese lines into two encircled "pockets" of resistance that could be quickly destroyed.

Victorious Soviet Soldiers Greet Each Other After Encircling Japanese Forces, 1939 

On August 20th, 1939, Zhukov put his plan into action. At 5:45 A.M, a fleet of Soviet bombers unleashed a flurry of bombs on Japanese positions. For the next 3 hours, Soviet artillery blasted the Japanese lines. Then, at 9:00, Soviet Forces began to advance on the Japanese lines. The climactic battle of Khalkhin Gol was underway. The Japanese were caught completely off guard, yet, they quickly responded with tenacious resistance. The Southern force, with the shortest distance to reach the Japanese rear, and supported with the largest tank strength, made the most progress in the initial onslaught, but the Central and Northern forces became ensnared in ferocious fighting. Komatsubara found himself caught in a tough situation: keenly aware of the Soviet threat to his southern flank, Komatsubara wished to shift elements of his 23rd Division south to meet the threat, but Soviet pressure on his beleaguered soldiers in the north compelled the Japanese commander to reinforce that endangered flank instead. To keep pressure on the Japanese northern flank, Zhukov committed the 9th Armored Brigade and the paratroopers of the 212th Brigade to his northern force. As a result, Japanese attention was forced to remain focused on their northern flank. This left the Southern flank of the Japanese line undermanned. By August 23rd, the Southern force of the Soviet Line had reached the border with Manchuria, cutting off any Japanese retreat from the area below the Holsten River. On August 24th, the Soviet 9th Armored Brigade linked up with the 8th Armored Brigade, and encirclement of the Japanese was complete. Attempts by Japanese Reinforcements to relieve the encircled 23rd Infantry Division between August 24th-26th were repulsed by heavy Air and Armor assaults. By August 31st, all Japanese resistance in the pocket had been crushed. The Japanese reported 8,717 killed and 10,997 wounded; The Soviets reported 8,931 killed, and 15,952 wounded, for a total loss of 17,648 dead and 26,949 wounded. In reality, the losses were almost certainly much higher (some scholars put Japanese Losses as high as 60,000 killed and wounded, with a total loss of over 100,000). Although sporadic air fighting continued until September 16, for all intents and purposes, the Battle of Khalkhin Gol was over. The Soviet Victory was complete.

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Part 3: Reasons For Victory.

Soviet Generals Grigori Shtern (left) and Georgy Zhukov (right) confer with Mongolian Premier Khorloogiin Choibalsan (Center)

The Soviets managed to pull this impressive victory due to several factors that put them at a distinctive advantage. If you've been paying attention, you'll known that we've already discussed the advantage the Soviet's had in resupplying their troops (and if you haven't, I can't say I blame you), but even in spite of these deficiencies, the Japanese could still have achieved victory: they outnumbered the Soviets throughout most of the Conflict, with most of their forces made up of veterans of the Japanese Army's campaigns in Manchuria and China. With proper planning and tactics, the Japanese could have easily steamrolled the Soviet defenders. So why did they loose? There are several other reasons.

Firstly, when it came to equipment, the Soviets simply had the advantage. While the Japanese Nakajima Ki.27 fighters were newer and more maneuverable, the older Soviet Polikarpov I-153 biplanes and Polikarpov I-16 monoplanes were still able to dominate the air. This was for several reasons. Firstly, the Soviet fighters were better armed than their Japanese counterparts: The I-153's and I-16's were armed with four 7.62mm ShKAS Machine Guns, while their Japanese counterparts were only armed with two 7.7mm Type 89 machine guns. Secondly, while the Japanese fighters were more maneuverable than the Soviet fighters, this came at a cost: the Ki.27 fighters were left lightly armored to improve manuverablility, which resulted in them getting shot to pieces when facing Soviet Pilots, many of whom were veterans of the fighting 'round Madrid during the Spanish Civil War. On the ground, it was a similar situation: The Japanese Type 89 I-Go, Type 95 Ha-Go, and Type 97 Chi-Ha tanks and tankettes were out-armored, out-gunned, out-classed, and out-numbered by Soviet T-26's and BT-5's. Concerning artillery, it was the same situation: Japanese guns were out-numbered and of smaller caliber than their Soviet counterparts (as was already mentioned earlier). Even the small arms in the hands of Soviet Infantry were (arguably) better: Soviet Mosin-Nagant M91-30's were of a higher caliber than the Japanese Type 38's and Type 99's, The Type 38's and Type 99's were fine rifles, but their comparatively low caliber meant that they had less stopping power than the Soviet Mosin Nagants. Soviet PPD Sub-Machineguns outclassed and outnumbered older Japanese MP-18's, and Soviet DP-28 light squad Machineguns outclassed their Japanese Type 11 counterparts. All and all, Soviet equipment simply outclassed their Japanese Competitors.

Secondly, Soviet Tactics were simply better suited and tailored to the fighting at hand. The Japanese failed to properly coordinate their armored vehicle attacks in tandem with infantry support, and, because of inter-military political squabbles, greatly limited the amount of offensive air support Japanese Commanders at the front were allowed to use. The Soviets, on the other hand, closely coordinated their armored vehicles with their infantry units, combing tanks, planes, trucks, and infantry support in a strategy that has been described by some as a "Proto-Blitzkrieg," This close coordination of different units, combined with the general technological superiority of Soviet Equipment, allowed for the Soviets to mount a successful defense and launch successful attacks, even though the spent the majority of the battle outnumbered my allied Manchurian-Japanese forces.

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Part 4: Aftermath

Signing of the Soviet-Japanese Non-Aggression Pact, 1941

Despite the size and scope  of the Khalkhin-Gol campaign, it was little known outside of Japan and the Soviet Union. Mortified by defeat in battle, the Japanese sought to conceal their disgrace. For its part, the Soviet Union was preoccupied with setting up defensive positions to thwart predicted German invasion in the newly acquired territories of eastern Poland and the Baltic States, and did little to trumpet its victories in the Far East. Nevertheless, despite how unknown the battle was, both during the time it took place and today, the effects of the Battle were immense, so much so that they may have fundamentally changed the outcome of the war. Firstly, the Battle served as one of the first major defeats of Japanese forces in the Far East, second only after the Chinese victory at Taierzhuang the previous year. However, while Taierzhuang had been a successful defensive operation, Khalkhin Gol was the first major offensive blow that had been dealt to the Japanese. This cause an increase in morale among both Soviet and Chinese forces fighting the Japanese in China, and humiliated Japanese troops both in the home islands and in China/Manchuria. 

Secondly, this battle launched the careers of several important officers, who would later go on to serve with distinction (or disgrace, as the case may be) in the later stages of World War 2. On the Soviet Side, the most famous of these officers was the overall Soviet Commander, General Georgy Zhukov, a brilliant tactical who much of the victory was credited to. Zhukov won his spurs at Khalkhin Gol, and thereby won Stalin’s confidence to entrust him with the high command in late 1941, just in time to turn back the German's from the Gates of Moscow in December, and start him and the Red Army on a path of victory that would culminate in the capture of Berlin and defeat of the Germans in May 1945. His fellow commanders, however, were not so lucky: The overall commander of the operation, General Grigori Shtern, and the Commander of Soviet Air Forces in the region, General Yakov Vladimirovich Smushkevich, were arrested for charges of being a part of a Trotskyist conspiracy by KGB agents on the orders of notorious KGB commander Lavrentiy Beria, and were both shot on October 28th, 1941. Both Generals were extremely capable and talented commanders who had served with distinction in both the Spanish Civil War and the Winter War, and their purging dealt a blow to the Soviet Union during the early months of Operation Barbarossa, where talented commanders were few and far-between.

On the other side of the Conflict, the Japanese command fared far worse. Disgraced by his defeat, Michitarō Komatsubara resigned his commission as an officer and retired from the armed services. He died of Stomach Cancer in October of 1940, less than 8 months after his retirement. His second-in-command, General Masaomi Yasuoka, was relieved of command and transfered to the 3rd Depot division, after which he promptly retired in disgrace. In 1942, he was appointed military governor of the city of Surabaya in Indonesia, a position he served until he was captured in 1945. Convicted of War crimes, he was executed in 1948.  The only successful Japanese officer to come out of this great defeat was Masanobu Tsuji: A Japanese Staff officer who, at the time, was notorious for his aggressive nature and Anti-Soviet sentiment. Tsuji was a leading member of the "Strike North" faction of the Japanese Military, and it is suspected that he may have directly ordered the Manchukuoan attack on Mongolian forces that started the battle. After the defeat, Tsuji was able to escape major disgrace due to his (relatively) lowly position in the high command, and was transferred to the staff of General Tomoyuki Yamashita. It was here that Tsuji's incredible talent for planning and organization were shown: nicknamed "The God of Operations," he was the mastermind behind such operations as the Japanese invasions of Malaya, Burma, the Philippines, and Singapore. He also was responsible for several massacres of Chinese civilians in Singapore, and was the mastermind behind the Bataan death march. Hew was never charged with anything ,and returned to Japan after the war to become a successful politician He disappeared in Laos in 1961.

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the defeat of the Japanese at Khalkhin resulted the abandonment of the so-called "strike north" strategy by the Japanese armed services. As you may recall, before Khalkhin Gol, the Japanese armed services, in particular the high command, were split into factions over where Japan should expand into first. The so-called "Strike North" strategy, supported by the army, called for focusing on invading Northern China, Mongolia, and the Eastern Portion of the Soviet Union, in order to both secure resources in the Soviet far east (in particular, oil and steel), while at the same time "Striking a blow at Communism." The "Strike South" strategy, supported by the Navy, instead called for Japanese forces to strike, you guessed it, southwards, towards the western colonies/territories of Indonesia, New Guinea, Burma, Indochina, India, Australia, New Zealand, and Hawaii, in order to secure vital resources, such as metals and petrol, for the Japanese war machine. This strategy. they hoped, would bring them in conflict with these territories colonial masters: France, Great Britain, the Netherlands, and the United States. Before the defeat, the northern strategy seemed to be gaining both the Emperor and high command's favor: Assault on the Soviet Union would bring them into conflict with fewer world powers, could potentially be coordinated with their German allies, and was seen as "finishing the job" that was started with the Russo-Japanese War some 40 years earlier. After the defeat, however, everything changed: High Command realized that they had severely underestimated both Soviet Technological and Tactical strength in the region, and the "Strike North" faction's influence began to dwindle. The final nail in the coffin of the "Strike North" faction was the signing of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact between the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany in August of 1939, which guaranteed neutrality both between the 2 parties and their allies. With any hope, so it seemed, of German help for an invasion of the Soviet Union gone, the "Strike North" faction died away, and the Soviets and Japanese signed their own Neutrality Pact in April of 1941. High command now fully embraced the "Strike South" strategy, and turned it's attention to the Pacific colonies of the old western empires.

The effects of this change would shape the war in the pacific, and possibly, the outcome of World War 2 itself. First of all, the shift of strategy forced Japan into conflict with the Imperial Powers of the Netherlands, France, and Great Britain, all of whom still had colonies or allied territories (Australia and New Zealand) in the Pacific. Because of this aggression, the United States declared an embargo off oil exports to Japan in July of 1941: a particularly damaging move since 80% of Japan's oil at the time came from the United States. This embargo prompted Japan to, in an attempt to intimidate the United States into rescinding the embargo, launch a surprise attack on the US Pacific Fleet at Pearl harbor on December 7th, 1941, as well as launching attacks on British Colonies such as Burma and Singapore. As any schoolchild knows, the attack had the opposite effect, and the bombing brought the full military productive forces of the United States into the War. As a result of this, the Japanese now had to fight on 3 separate fronts (Burma, China, and the Pacific Islands): against 3 respective enemies: China: the most populous nation in the world, Great Britain and the commonwealth nations: the largest Land empire on earth, and the United States: the largest productive force on earth. While Japan was a "little Giant" on the East Asian scene, taking on one of these enemies would have been daunting: taking on all 3 at once was suicidal. The victories Japan won in early 42-43 were stopped at Guadalcanal, New Guinea, and Midway, and the Japanese suffered losses there that they could never replace.

Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, this Japanese focus on the south might have saved the Soviet Union from destruction and, thereby, perhaps even the west from Nazi rule. When Germany invaded the USSR with Operation Barbarossa in June 1941, they asked Japan to in turn strike the Soviet Union in the East in an attempt to split soviet forces and force them to fight on two fronts. After much internal debate, the Japanese, remembering the lesson of Khalkhin Gol, declined, and instead maintained neutral relations with the Soviets until the Soviet Invasion of Manchuria in 1945. This allowed for the Soviets to move thousands of troops and equipment from the Far East to the West to stop the Nazi's, and are most likely what saved the Soviets from total defeat in the west during the Summers of 1941-43. Picture, if you will, a scenario in which the Japanese had focused their attention on the Soviet far east and China instead of the Pacific. If the Japanese HAD invaded at the same time as the Germans, as Hitler Planned, then Soviet forces, forced to fight on two fronts, would have given up much more territory, or, in a worst case scenario, be defeated entirely. Victory in the east would also have given the Axis powers access to Russian oil fields, allowing them to operate their chronically under-fuelled forces at full potential. And, without the soviets to pin down the Majority of German troops in the west, the Nazi's would have had the necessary forces to launch offensive operations to knock out both Allied north Africa and the United Kingdom itself. The outcome of the war would have been quite different.

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Epilouge:

Russian President Dmitry Medvedev and Mongolian President Tsakhiagiin Elbegdorj standing in front of a statue of Zhukov at a ceremony in Ulaanbaatar in August 2009, commemorating the 70th anniversary of the battle

World War II was a truly massive affair. From the streets of the Warsaw Ghetto to the Bocage around Normandy, from the deserts of Iraq to the picturesque tiny nation of San Marino, and everywhere in-between, the whole world was touched by war. Several Hundred Million men, women, and children fought in it, and Up to 100 million people, 5% of the population, died in it. And yet, while Khalkhin was tiny compared to some of the other, much larger battles that happened during the war, and while, outside of Mongolia and Eastern Russia, it is practically unknown, the ramifications it had can be felt far and wide. What began as a dispute over where a border lay ended deciding the fate of human history: The Allied victory in World War 2, the cold war, the Communist Revolution in China, all of these can be traced back to the Summer of 1939, when the peaceful Mongolian Steppe erupted in fire to decide the fate of Mongolia, China, Japan, the USSR, and the World itself.

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Thanks Again

-SwordsAndSocialism

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Sources:

• http://historyofrussia.org/khalkhin-gol-battle-nomonhan/
• http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battles_of_Khalkhin_Gol
• http://www.historynet.com/world-war-ii-soviet-and-japanese-forces-battle-at-khalkhin-gol.htm
• http://www.historyguy.com/worldwartwo/battle_of_khalkhin_gol_193.htm#.VV9qRbNFDJO
• www.armchairgeneral.com/rkkaww2/battles/khalkhin_gol/losses.htm
•  www.armchairgeneral.com/rkkaww2/battles/khalkhin_gol/Khalkhin_cut1.pdf